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FEATURE
Wrongful Convictions and the Accuracy
Of the Criminal Justice System
by H. Patrick Furman
Editor's Note: In a future issue of The Colorado Lawyer, a
member of the Colorado District Attorneys Council ("CDAC")
intends to provide a different perspective on the issue of wrong-
ful convictions.
The wrongful conviction of an innocent person is the worst
nightmare to anyone who cares about justice. Eighty years ago,
Judge Learned Hand said, "Our procedure has always been
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an
unreal dream."' The good judge was, as events of the last decade
have conclusively proved, simply wrong. Although the criminal
justice system has a number of safeguards designed to ensure
that wrongful convictions are avoided, and the overwhelming
majority of convictions are accurate determinations of fact, it is
clear that wrongful convictions do occur.
For decades, public attention focused on the danger of a
guilty person going free. Some people question, for example,
whether the trade-off created by the exclusionary rule between
the loss of probative evidence and the need to regulate police
conduct is appropriate.2 Others argue that the courts are too
stingy in admitting evidence of other misconduct by a criminal
defendant. 3 Although these issues can affect the accuracy of
factual determinations by the criminal justice system, this ar-
ticle focuses on the other side of the accuracy issue: the danger
of convicting a factually innocent person.4 Recent advances in
DNA technology and other forensic sciences, along with hard
work by lawyers and non-lawyers alike, have focused attention
on the danger and reality of convicting an innocent person.5
CONCERN ABOUT
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
Wrongful convictions are a concern of prosecutors and defense
lawyers, liberals and conservatives, lawyers and non-lawyers.
The issue involves the accuracy in the justice system, and ac-
curacy is a goal that is shared by everyone. It concerns anyone
who cares about law enforcement and public safety. For every
innocent person wrongfully convicted, a guilty person roams
free. Indeed, because the justice system is one of the corner-
stones of democracy, it is not an overstatement to say that wrong-
ful convictions concern anyone who cares about a democratic
society.
A criminal justice system should be fair to all: wealth, race,
and social status should not affect the administration ofjustice.
American constitutional history is replete with cases address-
ing this promise. For example, Gideon v. Wainwright estab-
lished the right to counsel, regardless of ability to pay;6 Thmey
v. Ohio established the right of a defendant to a judge free of
personal interest in the case;7 Brady v. Maryland established
the right of a defendant to exculpatory information in the hands
of the prosecution;8 and Batson v. Kentucky barred the improp-
er use of race injury selection.9 Decisions like these breathe life
into the principle that no one shall be denied life or liberty with-
out due process of law and that all persons are entitled to the
equal protection of the law.
Even more fundamental is the principle that no justice sys-
tem can operate fairly unless it can accurately determine guilt
and innocence. The accuracy of the criminal justice system has
been called into question in recent years by revelations, often
generated by new DNA investigative techniques, of innocent
people across the country in prisons and even on death rows.
THE FREQUENCY OF
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
It is impossible, given the state of current knowledge, to de-
termine precisely how many innocent people have been wrong-
fully convicted. A Harris Poll of Americans taken in 2000 re-
vealed that 94 percent of those surveyed believed that innocent
people are sometimes convicted of murder, and estimated that
this happens 13 percent of the time.10 Results of surveys of par-
ticipants in the Ohio criminal justice system and of attorneys
general across the United States were reported in a 1996 book
in which the authors concluded that the best estimate of wrong-
ful convictions from these respondents was 0.5 percent.1 1 In
January 2003, it was reported that at least 13 of the 167 in-
mates on death row in Illinois (approximately 8 percent) were
innocent. This first led to a moratorium on the death penalty,
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next to a major study of capital punishment in Illinois, and then
to the commutation of all remaining death sentences to life im-
prisonment.
12
The question of wrongful convictions in capital cases has
been studied more than the question of wrongful convictions
generally. Error rates in capital cases may be higher or lower
than error rates in other cases, but there is no obvious reason to
assume that the error rates are significantly different. A 1987
study of potentially capital cases-cases in which the death
penalty was, or could have been, sought-attempted to deter-
mine the reasons for such errors. This study found 350 cases of
wrongful convictions in America between 1900 and 1984.13 Re-
search into the appellate treatment of death penalty cases has
indicated that as many as two-thirds of the death sentences im-
posed in American trial courts have been reversed by appellate
courts, although only a fraction of these reversals was based on
findings of actual innocence.1
4
If the general public's estimate of a 13 percent error rate in
murder convictions is applied to the total number of serious
crimes (the FBI's so-called "index crimes") for which there is a
conviction, the number of wrongful convictions is more than
200,000. Even if the most conservative estimate, that 99.5 per-
cent of convictions are valid, 7,700 innocent people were con-
victed of serious crimes in the year 2000.15 Applying the Illinois
death row error rate of 8 percent yields more than 123,000
wrongful convictions.
Clearly, no system will ever be perfect, and a 99.5 percent ac-
curacy rate would be an admirable achievement. Some com-
mentators have argued that errors are inevitable and, even in
capital cases, acceptable.16 Others would argue that the wrong-
ful conviction of 7,700 people-much less, 123,000 people-is
simply unacceptable. Still others question the accuracy of any
of these error rates. However, regardless of how the accuracy
rate is viewed, or how the trade-offs between the need to con-
vict the guilty and the need to exonerate the innocent are bal-
anced, most would agree that reasonable steps can be taken to
improve accuracy in the criminal justice system.
SOME CAUSES OF
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
There is a better understanding of the reasons why erro-
neous convictions occur than there is of the overall error rate.
In cases where error has been established, it is becoming in-
creasingly clear that mistaken identification is the leading
cause of erroneous convictions.17 The other common causes of
wrongful convictions are: ineffective representation by defense
counsel; police and prosecutorial misconduct; perjured testimo-
ny, particularly by government informants; and the corruption
of scientific evidence.' 8 Each of these is discussed in this sec-
tion. First, a general description of wrongful conviction statis-
tics and what they mean is in order.
The seminal study of the causes of wrongful convictions was
conducted by Yale Law Professor Edwin Borchard and pub-
lished in 1932.19 The study reviewed 62 convictions from 27
American jurisdictions and 3 convictions from England, all culled
from a larger group of possible wrongful conviction cases that
Borchard evaluated.20 This study concluded that the most com-
mon cause of wrongful convictions was mistaken identification,
the primary cause of 29 of the 65 wrongful convictions. 21 Per-
jurious witnesses, over-reliance on circumstantial evidence, and
overzealous prosecution were deemed the other most frequent
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causes of wrongful convictions. 22 Borchard also noted that false
confessions were a recurring cause of wrongful convictions.23
Some things have not changed much since then. In a book
published in 2001, the most common causes of wrongful con-
victions were determined to be mistaken identifications, police
and prosecutorial mistakes and misconduct, false confessions,
and the misuse of informants.24 Two major Canadian studies
have highlighted the existence of the same types of deficiencies
in Canadian procedures. 25 What has changed from Borchard's
1932 study is that ineffective assistance of defense counsel is
now recognized as a significant contributing factor to many
wrongful convictions.26 This may be a reflection of the increas-
ingly important role played by defense counsel in criminal cas-
es during that interval (and the increasing scrutiny to which
that role has been subjected), rather than a reflection of a de-
cline in the quality of representation.
Data concerning the causes of wrongful convictions are be-
coming both more plentiful and precise. Improvements in the
use of DNA as a forensic tool continue to help improve the ac-
curacy of the fact-finding process. Although DNA evidence is
not available to prove the innocence of a wrongfully convicted
person in most cases, the cases in which it has been used to
help demonstrate innocence have received a great deal of press
attention and have helped spark more public attention and re-
search into the causes of wrongful convictions.
As discussed below, sometimes, as in the overwhelming num-
ber of mistaken identifications, the mistake is an "honest" one;
that is, there is no intentional corruption of the system. Some of
the mistakes and misconduct of defense counsel, prosecutors,
or police also fit this description. However, other errors are the
result of intentional misconduct by one or more actors in the sys-
tem. To reduce the incidence of mistakes, proposals for improv-
ing the accuracy of the system must distinguish between the
different types of errors and the reasons those errors occur.
Wrongful convictions that have been exposed through the
use of DNA evidence have received a disproportionate share of
publicity, perhaps because of the newness of the technology or
because of the often-incontrovertible nature of the exculpatory
evidence. However, most cases are not susceptible to re-evalua-
tion with DNA technologies for many reasons, such as because
there is no biological material capable of being tested or re-test-
ing does not answer the relevant questions.21 Issues concern-
ing the accuracy of the criminal justice system grow even more
troubling when race is considered. Any criminal justice system
needs to periodically examine itself to determine whether race
(or gender, wealth, ethnicity, or any other offender or victim
characteristic) is improperly entering into the determination of
guilt and innocence or into sentencing decisions. There has
been a fair amount of research and scholarship into this ques-
tion in the limited context of capital punishment, the general
context of the criminal justice system, and the context ofwrong-
ful convictions.28
At least four significant studies have been conducted on the
impact of race on wrongful convictions. A 1987 study of 350 cas-
es of wrongful convictions in sexual assault and homicide cases
led to the conclusion that "the risk of a miscarriage of justice
falls disproportionately on blacks when compared to their rep-
resentation in the population, but not in comparison to their
arrest rates."2 9 In other words, any miscarriage ofjustice that
exists lies in the arrest rate, not in the error rate after arrest. A
1996 study of 205 wrongful felony convictions concluded that
"a disproportionate number are black or Hispanic."' 0 Another
September
efAre footprints as
,oolproof as fingerpdints?
S, - \The Mealey's E-Mail News Report notified the
defense attorney of a recent court decision from the
,. highest court in a neighboring state. He was surprised
-i ,to find the prosecution's expert witness had also
testified in that case. But the court held that footprints
from inside a shoe were not a recognized area for
expert testimony under the Daubert standard. As the
defense attorney continued his search of analytical
sources from Matthew Bender, including Moore's
Federal Practice® on the LexisNexis T- services, he quickly
found further supportive commentary and analysis.
When you need to go a step beyond cases and
"# codes in your research, use the LexisNexis-
'>\ /3 Total Research System-it's how you know.
LexisNexisTM
It's how you know T
(For your free trial* on the LexisNexis Total Research System go to www.lexisnexis.comlfreeweek or call 877.810.5324 )
The LexisNexis Total Research System "free trial offer' is available to law firms in the United States who have not subscribed to the LexisNexis online services within the last 30 days from the date ot this publication.
Additional restrictions may apply. Current LexisNexis customers should contact their account representative forinformation.
LexisNexis and the Knowledge Burst logo are trademarks of Reed Elsevier Properties Inc., used under license. It's How You Know is a trademark of LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc.
Matthew Bender is a registered trademark of Matthew Bender Properties Inc. Moore's Federal Practice is a registered trademark ofMatthew Bender & Company. Inc.
© 2003 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
TM
Wrongful Convictions and the Accuracy of the Criminal Justice System
1996 study of 87 persons released from death rows in America
found that 54.4 percent of those released were members of a
minority group.31 Finally, a 2000 study that focused on cases in
which the wrongfulness of the conviction was established by
DNA evidence concluded that at least 57 percent of the wrong-
ful convictions involved a defendant who was a member of a
minority group.3 2
One of the facts that those concerned about the criminal jus-
tice system find troubling where wrongful convictions have
been uncovered is that, in many cases, the criminal justice sys-
tem was not the vehicle by which the error was discovered. Some
have argued that revelations about wrongful convictions are
proof that the system "works," but often it is not the system, but
volunteer students, a persistent family member, apro bono law-
yer, or simple serendipity that uncovers the wrong.33 Regard-
less of how the error is discovered, accuracy is critical to the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system and it, in turn,
is critical to the proper functioning of society. Reasonable efforts
should be made to ensure the integrity of that system. An un-
derstanding of the causes of wrongful convictions may help in
this process.
Mistaken Identification
There seems to be a consensus that the single most common
factor contributing to wrongful convictions is mistaken identi-
fication. A study of 500 wrongful convictions that also reviewed
earlier studies reached this conclusion in 1987.34 A more recent
study of 70 cases in which DNA evidence provided evidence
that an innocent person had been wrongfully convicted con-
cluded that mistaken identification was a factor in 87 percent
of the cases studied.35
Academic research on the topic has resulted in some unset-
tling statistics as well. Four crime-simulation studies of 294
people who attempted a total of 536 identifications in simulat-
ed robberies found that only 42 percent of the "eyewitnesses"
correctly picked out the perpetrator.36 Many (perhaps most)
cases of wrongful conviction are the result of more than one fac-
tor, but these studies clearly indicate that improving the accu-
racy of the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of
the offense is the single most important improvement the jus-
tice system could make to address the overall problem of wrong-
ful convictions. In almost all mistaken identification cases, the
mistakes are genuine; that is, it is unusual to find a case in which
a witness has purposefully identified the wrong person as the
perpetrator.37 Thus, witness misconduct is generally not an is-
sue in these cases. However, all mistakes, whether honest or
not, undercut the integrity of the fact-finding process.
These mistakes are exacerbated by the fact that the typical
juror commonly places great confidence in identifications by
eyewitnesses, particularly when those eyewitnesses testify with
confidence. Studies have shown that (1) the confidence of an
eyewitness in the accuracy of his or her identification is not re-
lated to the actual accuracy of that identification; but (2) the
confidence exhibited by the witness is a "crucial determinant
of believability" by jurors.' Other studies have demonstrated
that jurors place more confidence in eyewitness identification
testimony than in other types of testimony.39 Further, the av-
erage person possesses a host of other misconceptions regard-
ing the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony.4°
Psychologists and other social scientists have studied and re-
ported on the reasons witnesses might initially be inaccurate
in their selection of a perpetrator, but such findings are beyond
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the scope of this article.41 Studies more relevant to this article
focus on what the police can do to best preserve identification
evidence42 and on whether line-up procedures used by law en-
forcement personnel exacerbate the dangers of mistaken iden-
tification.43 These studies look at both actual cases in which
some identification procedure was conducted and mock identi-
fication procedures. 44
Those who have addressed what the police can do to best
preserve identification evidence recommend straightforward
measures, such as the following. First, law enforcement should
get as detailed and thorough a description of the perpetrator of
an offense as quickly as possible. This is based on findings that
a person's memory of an event is best immediately after the
event, that memory then tends to fade quickly for a relatively
brief period of time, and that the rate of decline in retention
then levels off.4 5 Additionally, every effort must be made to en-
sure that law enforcement personnel do nothing during the
course of an investigation that might affect the ability of an
eyewitness to make an independent identification.
Line-up Procedures
Line-up procedures have been the focus of much analysis. A
2001 study of identification practices in Sacramento, Califor-
nia, analyzed 284 photographic line-ups and 58 live line-ups
conducted by law enforcement personnel.46 In the 284 photo
line-ups, the witness picked the suspect 48 percent of the time
(the remaining 52 percent yielded either no identification or an
incorrect identification).47 In the 58 live line-ups, 50 percent of
the witnesses selected the suspect, 24 percent selected a known
innocent who was part of the line-up, and 26 percent made no
selection at all.48 A British study conducted in 1994 found that
eyewitnesses selected a known innocent from the line-up in 22.5
percent of the cases. 49 Error rates in the range of 22 and 24 per-
cent are clearly unacceptable.
Luckily, data are also accumulating suggesting that relative-
ly modest changes in the traditional process of conducting pho-
tographic and live line-ups can significantly decrease the inci-
dence of misidentification.50 Most of these changes cost little, if
any, money after some fairly straightforward re-training of per-
sonnel and re-writing of procedures is conducted. Here are a few
of these procedures.
1. An eyewitness who is being shown photographs or live
suspects should be shown those photographs or live suspects
sequentially, rather than in a group.51 Traditionally photographs
or live suspects were shown to the eyewitness in a group. Re-
search indicates that sequential, rather than group, viewing re-
duces the danger that the eyewitness will simply pick the pho-
tograph or person that most closely resembles the perpetrator
based on the common and understandable belief of the eyewit-
ness that the perpetrator is in the line-up.52 For the same rea-
son, a request to look at a particular photograph or person should
be met by having the eyewitness review all of the people or all
of the photographs, not merely the requested one.
2. Another way of addressing the danger that a witness may
try too hard to identify someone, despite instructions that the
perpetrator may or may not actually be in the line-up, is to use
a line-up that does not contain the suspect.5' Although this car-
ries a number of risks, both substantive (a valuable witness
may be discredited beyond repair) and practical (it takes twice
as long and twice as many photographs or live alternates), it
can significantly boost the justifiable confidence in an identifi-
cation that is made in a second or subsequent line-up.
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3. Line-ups could be increased in size.54 American line-ups,
both photographic and live, traditionally number five or six.
Britain, by contrast, typically uses nine. A larger line-up size
may increase the ratio of correct to incorrect identifications in
the following fashion. In a larger line-up, an eyewitness who is
making his or her best guess, rather than truly identifying the
perpetrator, has more innocent "foils" from which to choose and
is therefore more likely to choose a known innocent rather than
inaccurately choose an innocent suspect.5 Colorado courts have
implicitly recognized this issue by holding that "the fewer the
pictures, the closer the array must be scrutinized for impermis-
sibly suggestive irregularities."
5 6
4. To avoid either intentionally or unintentionally giving clues
to the witness, line-up procedures should be conducted by a
person who does not know the identity of the actual suspect.
Traditionally, the person conducting the line-up procedure knows
the identity of the suspect.57 It appears that clues that a witness
is looking at or has selected the "right" person or photograph
often are given by the person conducting the line-up proce-
dure.5 8 Because these clues are usually unintentional and often
subtle, the only way to avoid the danger is to keep the person
conducting the line-up procedure in the dark as to the identity
of the person who is suspected by the police (a so-called "dou-
ble-blind" line-up procedure).5 9
5. Taking greater care and considering more variables in se-
lecting the "foils" may help reduce mistaken identifications. Tra-
ditionally, foils are selected based on their resemblance to the
suspect, and arguments about the fairness of the selections of-
ten have centered on whether the foils resembled the suspect.so
Some research suggests that foils should be selected with greater
consideration given to the eyewitness's description of the per-
petrator rather than to the appearance of the suspect.61
Regarding the selection of foils, one of the factors that courts
consider when evaluating the fairness of a photographic line-
up procedure is "the details of the photographs themselves.
6 2
Courts have required that the "photos [be] matched by race,
approximate age, facial hair, and a number of other character-
istics." 63 This command often is interpreted to mean that the
photos should match the suspect, not the description of the sus-
pect. It is hoped that the suspect matches the initial descrip-
tion so that this issue does not even arise. However, when there
are differences between the description and the suspect, con-
sideration should be given to including foils that match the de-
scription.
Witness Confidence and
Expert Testimony
A clear statement of the confidence level of the eyewitness at
the time the identification procedure is conducted can help avoid
problems associated with the loss of memory over time.64 A wit-
ness may grow less confident in his or her identification sim-
ply because of the passage of time between the identification
and the hearing or trial. Similarly, after seeing the suspect in
court, or learning about other incriminating evidence, the con-
fidence of an eyewitness may increase without any real justifi-
cation. A clear expression of the confidence level, ideally one
that is memorialized on tape, can help avoid this problem.
In Colorado, expert testimony on eyewitness identification is
limited by the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in Camp-
bell v. People,65 which rejected per se rules allowing or rejecting
such testimony and opting for a case-by-case analysis of the
need for this kind of testimony.66 After reviewing the rationales
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offered for admitting and excluding this testimony, the Court
held that Rules 702 and 403 of the Colorado Rules of Evidence
establish the test for admissibility, and that trial judges should
make an initial determination of admissibility before allowing
such testimony to be presented to a jury.67
On remand for reconsideration of the proffered expert testi-
mony on identification in Campbell, one of the defendant's con-
victions was affirmed by the trial court on the ground that the
proffered testimony was inadmissible under the Supreme
Court's standard.68 The proffered testimony related to the fact
that studies have shown that there is not a strong correlation
between the confidence of a witness in his or her identification
of a person and the accuracy of that identification. 69 That de-
termination was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which held
that in the factual context of the case, expert testimony "re-
garding studies showing a weak correlation between witness
confidence and reliability of identification" should have been
admitted.70
The case law thus gives counsel an opportunity to argue that
expert testimony on the issue of identification is admissible.
Testimony that addresses the confidence level of the witness
(as that offered in Campbell) or other issues surrounding iden-
tification, such as cross-racial identification 1 and the line-up
procedures, should be offered in an attempt to ensure that ju-
ries are fully informed about the strengths and weaknesses of
eyewitness identifications.
The need for a specific jury instruction on eyewitness iden-
tification has been considered by a number of courts. Such an
instruction was approved by the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in 1972.72 However, the need for a specific in-
struction has been rejected in Colorado on the ground that the
basic instruction pertaining to the credibility of witnesses is
adequate.73 Recent studies on the frequency and causes of mis-
taken identification may justify re-opening this issue.
A Study on Eyewitness
Evidence
In October 1999, following an eighteen-month study, the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued a report entitled "Eye-
witness Evidence: A Guide For Law Enforcement" ("DOJ Re-
port").74 Most of the recommendations described in the section
on line-up procedures described above are endorsed by the DOJ
Report. 5 The Report also contains guidelines for dispatch and
on-scene law enforcement personnel to help them obtain and
document information regarding identification, 6 suggestions
for the creation and use of "mug books" and composite draw-
ings,77 and information on the use of on-scene "show-ups."'7 The
DOJ Report acknowledges its debt to social sciences research
and urges those who administer the criminal justice system to
stay abreast of continuing research in this area.79
The DOJ Report's recommendations are only recommenda-
tions. It acknowledges that every case may present different is-
sues and constraints and that some law enforcement agencies
may be better able to implement the recommendations than
others80 Nonetheless, it seems clear that the Report constitutes
the "state of the art" in eyewitness identification procedures. As
such, law enforcement may wish to implement the DOJ recom-
mendations whenever possible.
Moreover, the DOJ Report's suggestions concerning inves-
tigative techniques are grounded in scientific study. There is a
clear consensus that the changes suggested for line-up proce-
dures will reduce the number of mistaken identifications. Some
September
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of these guidelines have been adopted by federal and state law
enforcement agencies. For example, the Attorney General of
New Jersey officially adopted the guidelines in April 2001 for
use in all adult and juvenile criminal cases8 Colorado may wish
to consider taking steps to follow suit.
The suggestions in the DOJ Report concerning the manner
in which the courts treat eyewitness identification cases are
based on a growing understanding of the scope and nature of
the problem. It seems that some of the common beliefs about
eyewitnesses (such as, the more certain an eyewitness is, the
more accurate the identification) are simply incorrect.8 2 Reliance
on jurors' common-sense "experience" with identification issues
may well be misplaced. Therefore, to improve accuracy of iden-
tification, prosecutors might insist that the highest possible
standards are being met, defense lawyers should be vigilant in
pointing out weaknesses in existing procedures, and the courts
may wish to continue to consider whether constitutional guar-
antees of due process require that some or all of the procedures
suggested by the DOJ Report be employed in any given case.
Ineffective Assistance
Of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees
counsel to a person accused of a serious crime."' This guarantee
extends to state prosecutions,s4 which also are governed by the
similar guarantee of counsel found in Article II, § 16, of the Col-
orado Constitution. The right to counsel has been interpreted
to mean that a criminal defendant is entitled to "effective" as-
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sistance.8,5 However, it is an unfortunate reality that defense
counsel who are charged with safeguarding the rights of per-
sons accused of crimes sometimes do not always perform their
jobs effectively.
Colorado has a strong and nationally respected criminal de-
fense system and seems to have a lower incidence of ineffective
assistance than many jurisdictions.8 6 Nevertheless, the prob-
lem exists in Colorado, as in other jurisdictions. Just because
counsel was ineffective does not establish that the defendant
was innocent, but ineffective assistance is clearly a major con-
tributing factor in cases in which there was a wrongful convic-
tion, as described below.
In studies of wrongful convictions, ineffective assistance of
defense counsel has been cited as a significant contributing fac-
tor in anywhere from 5 to 28 percent of the cases.87 It is not
clear whether this figure is higher or lower in non-capital cases.
It is hoped that only experienced and fully qualified lawyers
are representing capital defendants, and that the rate of inef-
fectiveness is therefore lower. On the other hand, it is not al-
ways true that experienced and qualified lawyers are handling
these extraordinarily difficult cases. Further, there are many
more ways for a lawyer to be ineffective in a capital case than
in a non-capital case--capital cases involve more procedural
and factual issues than other criminal cases. Finally, convic-
tions in capital cases are usually reviewed more thoroughly than
non-capital convictions and, therefore, instances of ineffective-
ness are more likely to be uncovered in capital cases.88 In any
event, there may be steps that the justice system can take to
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address the effectiveness of defense counsel. Identifying the
reasons why counsel is sometimes ineffective is the first step
in this process.
Sometimes, the ineffectiveness stems from the fact that a law-
yer is unprepared, unskilled, or inexperienced. Even in well-
funded public defender offices, the caseloads are high and, in
some jurisdictions, public defenders are overloaded or over-
whelmed. In jurisdictions that do not regulate the appointment
of lawyers as carefully as Colorado, the lawyers simply may be
lazy or unwilling to do the job right. Many have heard the story
of the Texas lawyer who slept through portions of his client's
capital sentencing hearing and assume that incident is apoc-
ryphal or ancient. It is neither: the trial of Calvin Burdine oc-
curred in 1984. In 1995, the highest criminal appeals court in
Texas held that the fact that trial counsel slept through portions
of the proceeding did not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel.89 Eventually, the federal courts vacated the death sen-
tence.90 However, it is well documented that hundreds of less
egregious cases of ineffective assistance occur each year.9'
The Colorado Criminal
Defense System
As noted, Colorado has a strong tradition of a vigorous and
effective defense bar, including the Office of Public Defender and
the Office of Alternate Defense Counsel ("ADC"), which provide
counsel for indigent defendants, and the private bar, which pro-
vides counsel for those who can afford to hire counsel.9 2 How-
ever, public defenders and private lawyers who contract to rep-
resent indigent criminal defendants continue to do so at a con-
siderable financial sacrifice. Salaries for public defenders are
lower than those offered in private practice, and hourly rates
for appointed counsel also are lower than what lawyers normal-
ly charge.93 The ADC pays private lawyers, who contract to ac-
cept cases when the Office of Public Defender has a conflict of
interest, far less than the hourly rate these attorneys charge
on the open market.94 Clearly, the Colorado system needs to
better support lawyers who engage in criminal defense work to
continue to attract and retain top-notch talent.
Although Colorado is currently faced with difficult budget is-
sues and seems likely to be facing them for several years down
the road, maintaining the criminal justice system is at the very
core of government and deserves special protection from the
ravages of the economy. Colorado courts need to make certain
that the promise of effective counsel is being fulfilled.
Along with salaries, the system needs to ensure that there is
adequate funding for support services, such as staff and inves-
tigators, as well as funding for enough positions, so that the
caseloads faced by the lawyers and staff are of a reasonable
size. Additionally, money needs to be provided for adequate train-
ing. The basic standard for evaluating whether counsel has
been ineffective has long been a two-part test: whether coun-
sel's performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard
and, if so, whether the deficient performance prejudiced the de-
fendant.95
There is a justified reluctance on the part of the courts and
counsel to second-guess trial counsel, as well as a common-
sense and legal recognition of the fact that a defendant is not
entitled to "perfect" representation.9 Nevertheless, courts need
to be vigilant in ensuring that the promise of effective assis-
tance is fulfilled. Doing so may not only redress any error in the
case at hand, but also may make clear to the practicing bar the
quality that is demanded of lawyers who handle criminal cases.
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Police and Prosecutorial Misconduct
Police and prosecutorial misconduct, as used in this article,
includes not only malicious misconduct (such as perjury and
intentional destruction or withholding of evidence), but also
conduct that is not based on an evil or corrupt motive (such as
failure to follow leads and inadequate investigation of witness-
es). Both types of conduct may contribute to a wrongful convic-
tion, but the remedies for the two problems are quite different.
Corrupt misconduct is rare in Colorado. The overwhelming
majority of law enforcement personnel and prosecutors are hon-
est and hard-working public servants. However, in one of the
DNA innocence studies of capital cases, police misconduct was
found to be a factor in 38 percent of the wrongful convictions,
and prosecutorial misconduct was found to be a factor in 34 per-
cent of the cases.97 Again, it is difficult to know whether this sort
of misbehavior occurs with equal frequency in non-capital cas-
es. It is hoped that police and prosecutors take extra care in
capital cases, but it is also true that the pressure to solve and
prosecute these cases, and thus the temptation to bend the
rules, is greater (particularly when an officer or prosecutor be-
lieves the actual perpetrator is in hand).
A recent study examined 11,452 cases nationwide in which
claims of prosecutorial misconduct were made in state court
appeals since 1970.98 Appellate courts cited prosecutorial mis-
conduct as a reason for reversing a conviction or reducing a
sentence in more than 2,000 of these cases.99 The appellate
courts found any error to have been harmless in 8,709 cases,
and did not address the issue (presumably because there was
no misconduct) in 731 cases.1°° These numbers must be put in
the context of the hundreds of thousands of cases that were
tried and the millions of cases that were prosecuted in state
courts during that period.10 1 This same study revealed 21 Colo-
rado cases in which a conviction or sentence was reversed due
to prosecutorial misconduct.102
As far as wrongful convictions, the study concluded that 28 of
the total convictions involving 32 separate defendants were
wrongful convictions. None of the wrongful conviction cases cit-
ed occurred in Colorado, which is a tribute to this state's sys-
tem. The numbers nonetheless make it clear that there needs
to be continued efforts nationwide to reduce prosecutorial mis-
conduct.
Police Misconduct
One example of malicious police misconduct is the agent who,
due to misguided zeal, a desire for glory, or some other reason,
offers inaccurate testimony. One of the most egregious recent
examples was an undercover agent in Texas whose testimony
resulted in thirty-eight drug convictions that were subsequently
challenged, and then investigated by the Justice Department,
the Attorney General of Texas, and the NAACP. A retired state
judge who was ordered by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
to review the matter found, with the agreement of all parties,
that the witness was "simply not a credible witness under
oath."10 3 A state grand jury subsequently indicted the agent on
three counts of aggravated perjury for allegedly lying to the
grand jury; prosecutors noted that the statute of limitations had
expired with regard to any possible perjury during the hear-
ings and trials.1°4 In Colorado also, there are occasionally cases
of police misbehavior.10 5
Police misconduct that is not dishonest, but is the result of
the all-too-frequent situation of caseloads that are far too high,
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can be traced to an obvious source: money. There is simply no
getting around the fact that it costs money for better training
and increasing the number of police officers on the street, tech-
nicians in the lab, and prosecutors in the courtroom.
Another possible solution to the caseload problem is to re-
think this country's whole approach toward crime. Some possi-
ble solutions may be politically controversial: Is too much mon-
ey being spent on detecting and prosecuting drug cases?' °6 Are
mandatory sentences really worth their costs?107 Have alterna-
tives to prison been adequately explored? Serious debate on
these questions often is shoved aside by political posturing aimed
at getting votes rather than addressing issues.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Colorado's experience with wrongful convictions due to pros-
ecutorial misconduct also is quite limited. Colorado has a tra-
dition of honest and well-qualified prosecutors. While they, like
everyone else, do make honest mistakes, intentional misbehav-
ior appears to be uncommon. Even when the misconduct is sig-
nificant enough to justify a new trial, however, it is not evidence
that the defendant was innocent.
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct often are raised in con-
nection with closing argument' 8 or other trial behavior.1°9 When
a contemporaneous objection to a prosecutor's conduct is made,
before reversing a conviction, a reviewing court still must find
that the defendant suffered prejudice;" 0 a defendant is no more
entitled to a perfect prosecutor than he or she is entitled to a
perfect defense lawyer. If no contemporaneous objection is made,
I~.
a reviewing court uses a plain error standard and will not re-
verse unless the prosecutorial misconduct is 'Tfagrantly, glaring-
ly, or tremendously imprope"' 111 and "so undermine[s] the fun-
damental fairness of the trial as to cast serious doubt on the re-
liability of the judgment of conviction."112
This is a difficult standard to meet, and the net result is that
the danger of prosecutorial misconduct is greater when the de-
fendant has an in'effective lawyer who fails to make timely ob-
jections. Other claims of prosecutorial misconduct arise in the
context of discovery disputes. A prosecutor may believe that he
or she is entitled to withhold information from the defendant
that a court later determines should have been revealed.13 In
this connection, the prosecution has a duty to help ensure that
evidence is properly preserved." 4
The Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly made it clear
that it holds prosecutors to a higher standard of ethical conduct
than other lawyers."5 This higher standard is premised on the
following: prosecutors are charged with enforcing the law as
agents of the state;1 6 they have far more power than the typi-
cal lawyer;" 7 and their duty is not to win, but to promote jus-
tice.18 This high standard needs to be maintained and encour-
aged.
Just as with the police and with defense counsel, salary is an
important issue with regard to prosecutors. To continue to at-
tract and retain top-notch talent as prosecuting attorneys, Colo-
rado must pay for that talent accordingly. The salary issue may
be even more acute for prosecutors than for public defenders
and attorneys who work for the Office of Public Defender and
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ADC. Salaries of prosecutors vary from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion because part of the salary is paid by the judicial district,
rather than by the state.119 Federal prosecutors are paid more
than their state counterparts.120 Also, while salaries in the larg-
er jurisdictions have generally kept pace with the salaries for
state public defenders, those in smaller and more rural juris-
dictions vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, gen-
erally lagging behind salaries in more populous parts of the
state.121
Most prosecutors choose public service knowing that they will
not be financially compensated as well as most of their breth-
ren in private practice, and accept that fact. On the other hand,
public service should not require a vow of poverty. The legal pro-
fession needs to take a positive role in helping support state
prosecutors. This support could include higher salaries and a
loan forgiveness program for attorneys who take public service
jobs, such as that of a state court prosecutor.
False Confessions
The idea that a person would confess to a crime that he or
she did not commit may seem preposterous. In the absence of
torture or other coercion, what could possibly induce a person
to confess? Psychological and sociological study, however, has
revealed that the phenomenon is very real.122 The Actual Inno-
cence study of wrongfully convicted persons found that 16 of
the 74 cases studied included reports from the police that the
person wrongfully convicted confessed to the crime.1'3 Although
physical coercion is largely a thing of the past, the interroga-
tion techniques used by law enforcement today sometimes re-
sult in false confessions.
Entire books have been written on the subject of extracting
information from people who do not volunteer to provide it.'2
Law enforcement personnel are instructed about such tech-
niques, as well as the law relating to the use of statements in
court.121 These interrogation techniques are powerful tools. Un-
fortunately, the same tools that persuade reluctant criminals
to confess to a crime they committed sometimes may persuade
innocent suspects to confess to a crime they did not commit. In
addition, some suspects have psychological or other issues that
may make them more likely to confess falsely.
As a general proposition, interrogations use a combination
of the following carrot and stick approach to persuade a person
to confess to a crime when the person is not inclined to do so
voluntarily.1 26 The stick includes attempting to persuade the
suspect that his or her position is hopeless. This is done by clear-
ly and repeatedly expressing a belief in the person's guilt, cutting
off any effort by the person to assert innocence or a defense, and
confronting the person with evidence (sometimes exaggerated
or fictitious) of guilt. The carrot consists of inducements to the
suspect to confess. These inducements can be appeals to moral-
ity ("it is the right thing to do"), psychology ("you will feel better
if you get it offyour chest"), sympathy ("the victim somehow de-
served it"), or basic self-interest ("we will tell the prosecutors
you cooperated").
Once a confession is obtained, the criminal justice system
treats the defendant quite differently.127 The obvious and un-
derstandable assumption of the actors in the justice system is
that the confession is valid and that the suspect is guilty Thus,
even while the presumption of innocence remains legally in
place, at all stages of the proceeding, from the filing of charges
and setting of bond through the conclusion of the case, the con-
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fessing suspect is often presumed guilty by the actors in the
criminal justice system-judges, defense counsel, and prosecu-
tors alike. 21
This different treatment accorded the suspect works entirely
to his or her detriment. Judges will consider the apparent
strength of a confession case when setting bond;129 defense
counsel, particularly those with an overwhelming caseload,
may choose to spend fewer resources on a confession case; po-
lice may be less likely to continue an investigation; and prose-
cutors may be less likely to demand more proof from investiga-
tors. Thus, one error that may lead to a wrongful conviction is
compounded by other choices and decisions that are based, at
least in part, on the initial error.
What can be done to reduce the incidence of false confessions?
First, improved training of the interrogators may be in order to
ensure that they are fully cognizant that the powerful tools they
employ in obtaining valid confessions sometimes can result in
false confessions as well. Second, the majority of statements by
suspects can be taped or even recorded on video. Although the
Colorado Court of Appeals has held that due process does not
require that taping procedures be employed,1 30 some states
have found such a requirement in their constitutions.13 1 Addi-
tionally, a number of studies have made this recommendation.1 32
Continued examination of such studies may lead the courts to a
new conception of the requirements of due process or of the "vol-
untariness" of a confession.
There are times when tape recording is not possible: it may
be that a hurried interview at the scene of a crime when an in-
vestigation is "hot" cannot wait for someone to show up with a
tape recorder, much less wait for a return to the stationhouse.
However, when a statement can be taped, there are strong ar-
guments that it should be taped. Taping of statements appears
to benefit the police, the defendant, the system, and the truth-
seeking function. Police who conduct interviews properly and
professionally may be much less subject to challenge by defen-
dants because the proof of what was said will be more accu-
rately preserved. Defendants who have been subjected to im-
proper pressures or procedures by the police likewise will have
their proof in hand. The number of suppression motions, or at
least the time taken to resolve such motions, should decrease.
Appellate review of suppression rulings should be facilitated. 13
The truth-elusive as that concept sometimes is-may be more
likely to emerge.
3 4
Every police department has the ability to tape statements,
and many already tape when they see fit to do so. The addi-
tional cost and burden of always turning on the tape machine
and saving the tape until the case is concluded is minimal. A
statute requiring such a procedure could contain language ex-
empting from its coverage those situations in which taping was
not feasible or in which no tape was produced through no fault
of the authorities. Taping statements might help reduce the in-
cidence of false confessions because taping should give experts,
as well as lawyers, judges, and jurors, a far more accurate view
of what really transpired in the interview room.
The Use of Informants
Law enforcement sometimes relies on informants to investi-
gate and prosecute criminal cases. However, witnesses who tes-
tify in exchange for some type of consideration from the gov-
ernment should be viewed with greater circumspection than
witnesses who testify without such inducements. This is because
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those given inducements might have an incentive to "bend"
their testimony to please those who hold power over them. This
is not true for the "average" witness. The study of wrongful con-
victions in capital cases found that inaccurate testimony by in-
formants was a contributing factor in 16 percent of the cases.13
After the wrongful conviction of Thomas Sophonow in Mani-
toba, Canada, the Manitoba DOJ undertook a study to deter-
mine what went wrong in the case. The inquiry came to the fol-
lowing conclusion about jailhouse informants:
Jailhouse informants comprise the most deceitful and de-
ceptive group of witnesses known to frequent the ourts....
They rush to testify like vultures to rotting flesh or sharks
to blood. Whether they seek favours from the authorities, at-
tention or notoriety they are in every instance completely un-
reliable.... Usually, their presence as witnesses signals the
end of any hope of providing a fair trial.1
36
This is harsh, and perhaps hyperbolic, language, but it is clear
that some witnesses who testify on behalf of the government
in exchange for some consideration may not be trustworthy.
Determining whether such witnesses are, on the whole, less
trustworthy than the "average" witness is difficult, but the added
incentive that may motivate these witnesses certainly would
seem to justify greater scrutiny.
There are several variations of inaccurate testimony by in-
formants. Like any other witness, an informant can be mistak-
en; an informant may "shade" his or her testimony in an effort
to please authorities; an informant may lie to deflect suspicion
from himself or others, or for some other reason; or an infor-
mant could be acting with the knowledge, or even at the behest,
of unethical authorities.
An egregious example of dishonest informants and govern-
mental misconduct in recent years involved the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation ("FBI"). A small-time New Jersey num-
bers runner named Peter Limone spent thirty-three years in
prison, four of them on death row, for a murder he did not com-
mit. He, along with three others, two of whom died in prison
and one whose sentence was commuted in 1997, was convict-
ed on the perjured testimony of a government informant. The
FBI agents working with this informant did not tell the prose-
cutors or anyone else about inducements offered to the inform-
ant nor did they tell anyone that they had received informa-
tion, prior to the murder, that the murder was going to occur
and the identity of the person who was going to commit it. To
protect their own informant, they said nothing, even after the
conviction and sentencing of innocent men.137
It is sometimes difficult to balance the need of law enforce-
ment to persuade witnesses to cooperate with the danger that
too much persuasion, or too much inducement, is an invitation
to lie. However, the balance is clearly out of whack when an in-
nocent man is convicted of murder and sentenced to die while
government agents intentionally help the actual murderer es-
cape justice.
Given the percentage of wrongful convictions that were at-
tributable, at least in part, to inaccurate testimony by cooper-
ating witnesses, some commentators have argued that special
precautions should be taken to ensure that the integrity of these
witnesses (and the reliability of their testimony) is examined
adequately.3 8 Prosecutors may wish to review the use of in-
formants more thoroughly. Also, discovery rules might provide
necessary background on these witnesses, cross-examination
limits might be re-examined, and both jury instructions and
legislation could address the issue.139
In-House Reform
One suggestion for "in-house" reform is to alter policies in the
offices of prosecutors that regulate the use of informants. 14° An
office could establish prerequisites to the use of a cooperating
witness. For example, a prosecutor's office could require an in-
vestigation into the background of the cooperating witness that
is much more intensive than that usually conducted. Cooperat-
ing witnesses often have histories of testifying for the prosecu-
tion. Thus, every instance of prior testimony by the cooperating
witness could be examined to determine whether the witness
appears to be a genuine fact witness or a professional "snitch."
Corroboration could be required for everything, or everything
important, the cooperating witness has to say. A senior deputy
who is not involved in the prosecution of the case could review
the case and the history of the witness to help ensure that the
use of the witness is appropriate.
Amend Discovery and
Evidence Rules
Discovery and evidence rules could be amended to ensure
that an adequate pre-trial investigation of a cooperating wit-
ness can be conducted by the defense. An informant does not
lose all privacy rights simply by virtue of becoming an infor-
mant, but it may be reasonable to allow the defense to subject
such a person to greater scrutiny than a witness who is testi-
fying free of any such motive.' 4' At least one state legislature
has recognized this concern.142
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Review of Cross-Examination Limits and Jury
Instructions
A review of both the limits on cross-examination and the jury
instructions relating to witnesses also may be in order. The
right to cross-examine is of constitutional magnitude, but is not
unlimited.1'3 The privacy rights of witnesses, the danger of un-
fair prejudice to the opposing party, and the interests ofjudi-
cial economy may justify certain limits on cross-examination.""'
However, the courts may want to re-examine the boundaries of
cross-examination when the witness is cooperating with the
government in the expectation of some type of benefit. The in-
herent untrustworthiness of such witnesses, as compared to
the true "volunteer" witness, may well justify the creation of a
different set of cross-examination boundaries.
By way of example, Colorado courts have limited the bound-
aries of cross-examination in ways that may not be appropriate
when the witness who is being cross-examined is an informant.
Colorado courts have held that it is not error for a trial court to:
* deny a defendant the right to cross-examine a prosecution
witness about his or her felony convictions when the pros-
ecution elicited that information in direct examination1"'
" elicit the fact that a witness was convicted of the misde-
meanor offense of false reporting, although the defendant
is allowed to elicit the lies that were the basis of that con-
viction 46
" inquire into the fact that bond-jumping charges could be
filed against a witness by the prosecution 147
" cross-examine a witness on the fact that the witness was
currently on probation for a misdemeanor offense or a fed-
eral offense"4s
* inquire as to whether a cooperating witness knew the penal-
ty for first-degree murder after eliciting information that
the witness had a first-degree murder charge reduced to
manslaughter by the prosecution 149
" elicit the fact that the witness was currently in custody on
a probation violation complaint, as well as new charges' 50
* cross-examine a witness on the penalty the witness was
facing for pending charges.151
Some of these limits could be re-examined in light of what is
now known about the effect of inaccurate testimony by cooper-
ating witnesses on wrongful convictions.
With regard to jury instructions, Colorado already has in-
structions relating to: (1) the general credibility of witnesses; 52
(2) the fact that the mere number of witnesses is not disposi-
tive of credibility issues;'5 3 (3) the fact that a felony conviction
may be used to assess credibility; 5 4 and (4) the use of evidence
of a witness's character for truthfulness.'55 Colorado has no in-
struction that specifically addresses the credibility of a cooper-
ating witness, although counsel can certainly use the general
credibility instruction to attack or support the testimony of a
cooperating witness. The federal system has such instructions.5 6
A Colorado jury instruction could be fashioned that draws the
attention of the jury to the special problems inherent in the use
of cooperating witnesses without unfairly penalizing the prose-
cution for the use of such witnesses.
New Legislation
Legislation might be a last resort, but it is not unprecedented
for the legislature to establish rules relating to the quality or
quantity of evidence that must be presented in a criminal pros-
ecution. In prosecutions for treason, the Colorado statutes re-
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quire that a conviction may not occur unless "upon the testi-
mony of two witnesses to the same overt act or upon confession
in open court."157 New legislation could require corroboration
of the testimony of a cooperating witness as a precondition of
conviction. It also could expend the limits that now exist on the
ability of counsel to cross-examine cooperating witnesses about
their agreements with the prosecution and police.
The legislature may be reluctant to intrude into relevancy
questions that typically are left to the courts. However, the use
of cooperating witnesses implicates the prosecution function as
much as the judicial function, and carries the danger of under-
mining the truth-seeking function and the integrity of the crim-
inal justice system. Therefore, it may be appropriate for the leg-
islature to act if the courts do not.
Corruption of Forensic
Evidence
Police, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and jurors increasingly
rely on expert witnesses. To a large extent, this reliance is jus-
tified. Scientific advances in a variety of fields have resulted in
the creation and application of forensic techniques that gener-
ate powerful evidence. DNA comparison is the most widely
hailed of these new forensic tools. The law of evidence has at-
tempted to keep pace with these advances.
15 8
Even science is not perfect, however. Close examinations of
forensic science techniques have uncovered previously unrec-
ognized variability in these methods. In a 1978 Laboratory Pro-
ficiency Testing Program sponsored by the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, hair analysis was found to be one
of the most troubling techniques, with unacceptable response
rates from laboratories in the range of 27 to 67 percent, de-
pending on the hair samples analyzed. 15 9
In a 1996 DOJ/National Institute of Justice report, approxi-
mately two-thirds of erroneous convictions involved evidence
based on traditional forensic techniques, such as hair analysis,
that were proven erroneous by DNA typing.160 Participants in
the criminal justice system need to continuously re-evaluate
the methods by which evidence is generated and tested and
take advantage of improvements as they occur.
Even though scientific advances demonstrate that reliance
on science in the past was sometimes misplaced, most of the in-
creased reliance on scientific evidence appears to have been
justified. 6 1 Also, as noted above, erroneous or false testimony
by an expert witness does not establish that the defendant was,
in fact, innocent. However, there have been unsettling incidents
in which the scientific testing, or the testimony about the test
results, was corrupted by either institutional or individual prob-
lems. Some of this corruption clearly has led to wrongful con-
victions. For example, the innocence study of wrongful convic-
tions in capital cases found that inaccurate or fraudulent sci-
entific testimony was a factor in 26 of the 70 cases studied.162
At the institutional level, it is clear that some laboratories
are not as good as they should be to accomplish the job. Even
the FBI, which is viewed as having the nation's pre-eminent
forensic laboratory, has been shown to have significant weak-
nesses. An eighteen-month investigation of the FBI lab, con-
ducted by the Office of the Inspector General of the DOJ and
with the cooperation of the FBI, concluded in 1997 that the FBI
lab needed to take significant steps to establish proper quality
control of its testing and of the testimony of the witnesses it of-
fered. 16 The report includes the following recommendations:
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1) steps should be taken "to provide personnel with the ap-
propriate training, background, and commitment to quali-
ty that is required in a first-class forensic laboratory";
2) the lab should seek and obtain accreditation by the Amer-
ican Society of Crime Laboratory Directors;164
3) each examiner who evaluates evidence should prepare
and sign a report concerning that evidence;
4) all analytical reports should be peer-reviewed;
5) a structured training and retraining program should be
established;
6) better record creation and retention policies should be
adopted;
7) written protocols should be developed and followed for all
testing procedures; and
8) various internal reorganizations should be implemented.16
A review of the FBI's response conducted in the year follow-
ing the report (1998) found that, in general, 'the FBI has done a
sound and responsible job of implementing the OIG recommen-
dations" 6 and recommended regular follow-up evaluations to
ensure that the improvements were continuing to occur. The
follow-ups do occur and continue to uncover problems with both
institutional controls and individual misbehavior. In 2003, the
DOJ's Office of the Inspector General concluded that a DNA
technician in the FBI lab failed to follow required testing pro-
tocol and that the internal checks of the lab did not uncover the
problem. 6 7 Clearly, continued vigilance is in order.
These problems are not limited to the FBI labs. In Texas, the
crime labs in both Houston and Fort Worth have been the sub-
jects of scrutiny. An audit of the Houston lab by the Internal Af-
fairs Division of the police department "uncovered shoddy sci-
ence [and] undertrained employees" and a facility that was so
overwhelmed and underfunded that its director conceded that
the facility could not "conduct the needed analysis on every
case that should be looked at."'16 Reviews of the DNA work con-
ducted by the Forth Worth police department concluded that
there were "serious concerns" about the training, knowledge,
and practices of a senior lab technician who was responsible for
evaluation and testimony in DNA cases." 169 As further described
below, a lack of institutional checks, balances, and controls may
fail to uncover and root out individuals whose scientific or tes-
timonial reliability is less than it should be.
At the institutional level, scientific labs and the scientists
who work there are not immune to outside pressures. Another
finding of the DOJ report on the FBI lab was that examiners
sometimes testified "to matters beyond their expertise or in
ways that were unprofessional...." 17 0 This improper testimony
invariably helped the prosecution. Explanations for this phe-
nomenon include an inadequate degree of separation between
the lab and the police and prosecutors, and an insufficient de-
gree of independence of the lab from those entities. The FBI re-
sponded to this criticism by promising to appoint directors based
on "an outstanding academic and practical background in for-
ensic science and a reputation for excellence in the forensic
community" rather than on any law enforcement connection.'
Some argue that forensic labs should be entirely independent
of the police and prosecutors and that this would be the true
"scientific" model. This would entail creation of a lab that is be-
holden to no one and uses established and unbiased procedures
to evaluate evidence and report on the results, regardless of
how those reports help or hurt one side or the other.
At the individual level, there have been a number of instanc-
es of false testimony by lab technicians and other experts. The
chief of the Serology Division of the state police lab in West Vir-
ginia was charged with peijury, evidence tampering, and fraud
in both Texas and West Virginia, after it was established that
he gave false testimony in a number of cases.1 12 A civil investi-
gation into his testimony resulted in a finding that he had 'faked
data in virtually every case for which there was sufficient evi-
dence to review."173 Civil suits filed against him made clear that
a number of people were involved in a cover-up of his behavior.
West Virginia paid millions of dollars to several of the innocent
individuals who were convicted on the basis of a victim's false
testimony.1 74 Other persons were granted new trials. 7 5
As far back as 1998, the competence of an Oklahoma City
Police Department forensic scientist who had testified in hun-
dreds of trials over the course of thirteen years, including twen-
ty-three cases in which the death penalty was handed down,
was called into question. In that Oklahoma City case, an ap-
pellate court reversed a murder conviction due to the expert's
lack of diligence in examining hairs and fibers, a report that
"was at best incomplete, and at worst inaccurate and mislead-
ing," and testimony that included an "improper" opinion about
the defendant's presence that "the expert "was not qualified to
give.' 7 6 Subsequently, the same expert was found to have given
testimony that "was misleading, if not false," after DNA tests
proved that her testimony was wrong in the case of a man who
had served fifteen years of a sixty-five year sentence for rape. 7
These two cases were not the only ones in which problems arose
around the forensic scientist's testimony.i 8
There are other examples of unprofessional conduct by lab
technicians and scientists. 7 9 Many of these are undoubtedly
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honest mistakes; others are the result of overworked employees
and understaffed labs that are not getting adequate funding
from the government. Some are clearly the result of lazy or dis-
honest people who testify falsely.'8 ° As a result, every govern-
mental crime lab needs to consider engaging in an evaluation
and continued review similar to that implemented in the FBI
lab.
The Colorado Bureau Of Investigation
In Colorado, the Colorado Bureau of Investigation ("CBI")
was created in 1967 and is now part of the Colorado Depart-
ment of Public Safety ("CDPS").' 8l Laboratories exist in Den-
ver, Pueblo, Montrose, and Durango. Legislation governing the
CBI provides that the function of the CBI is to assist "law en-
forcement authority in the investigation and detection of crime
and in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the state" and to
assist prosecutors in similar fashion. 82 The CBI laboratory de-
scribes as its mission: 'to provide highly specialized analytical
support to all law enforcement agencies within Colorado...."183
Clearly, the Colorado model is that the CBI is an arm-of-law
enforcement, as opposed to an independent laboratory open to
all players in the criminal justice system. It is not immediately
clear why this is so. There appears to be no inherent reason
why a forensic laboratory could not be open to both prosecutors
and defense lawyers. When the defense is being provided at
state expense, as is the situation in the overwhelming majority
of criminal cases in Colorado,184 such an arrangement might be
more cost-effective.
Prosecutors and defense lawyers argue that each side needs
its own experts. Presumably, each acknowledges that the sci-
ence is the same, while admitting that there is room for dis-
agreement among experts. More important, the argument is
that each side needs to work closely with its own experts about
case strategy and options, in addition to simply receiving sci-
entific results. Assuming that this argument justifies the role
of the CBI as an arm of law enforcement, it is still an open ques-
tion whether the CBI's governance structure is adequately in-
dependent.
The CBI and its labs were originally placed under the au-
thority of the Attorney General; control was transferred to the
Department of Local Affairs and then, in 1984, to the CDPS.185
The CDPS manages, in addition to the CBI, the Colorado State
Patrol, Division of Criminal Justice, Division of Fire Safety, and
the Office of Preparedness and Security. Clearly, the CDPS has
a law enforcement bent.
Some of the dangers that were noted in the DOJ Report on
the management independence of the FBI laboratories seem to
be present in the administration of the CBI laboratories. For
example, the DOJ Report urged the FBI to seek accreditation
from the American Society of Crime Lab Directors. As of this
writing, the only lab so accredited in Colorado is the Greeley
Police/Weld County Sheriff's Laboratory.ls6 It would be benefi-
cial for the CBI to seek and obtain this accreditation, as should
the crime labs of the other major metropolitan law enforcement
agencies. Accreditation would ensure that the CBI lab was in
conformity with agreed-upon standards and would also require
regular reviews of accreditations, processes, and controls in the
lab. An FBI review of the CBI labs and certain CBI procedures
is now under consideration in at least one Colorado district court
case.
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The criminal justice system needs to apply the highest pos-
sible standards to forensic laboratories, hire and support the
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most qualified personnel, and create a control structure that is
truly grounded in science. Only then will it ensure that the foren-
sic sciences help make more accurate determinations of both
guilt and innocence.
PROPOSALS TO HELP DECREASE
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
Recognizing that no system created and run by humans will
ever be free of error, it is nonetheless imperative to continually
search for improvements in the accuracy of the criminal justice
system. Following are several proposals to do just that. Some
of these proposals have been implemented in other jurisdic-
tions. Most can be implemented without much, if any, addition-
al cost. All will help improve the accuracy of our criminal jus-
tice system.
Ensure Adequate Funding
Colorado is in serious economic distress. All aspects of the
state government are being affected by this downturn, and
every government agency is advancing some argument as to
why it should be spared, or at least sheltered, from cuts in fund-
ing. Such economic problems seem likely to extend into the
next several years; even alter the economy improves, there will
be a significant recovery period during which state government
tries to restore what has been lost during the present difficul-
ties. Nevertheless, there are powerful and important argu-
ments that certain core functions deserve more protection from
budget cuts than other functions of state government. Public
safety is clearly a core fimction of state government. The jus-
tice system-judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers-is just
as important to this core function as are police and jails.
On a practical level, the costs of the criminal justice system
simply cannot be deferred as easily as can many other costs.
First, the system has little control over the volume of persons
using the system. Unless the state were to de-criminalize a num-
ber of offenses'88 or police and prosecutors were to stop enforc-
ing existing laws, both unlikely prospects, the number of crimi-
nal filings likely will increase. Even if the crime rate holds steady,
the increases in population alone will mean that more people
are brought in front of the criminal justice system. Such crimi-
nal cases must be addressed; they cannot be deferred or post-
poned. There are statutory and constitutional requirements
that these cases be handled expeditiously l8 9 In any case, al-
lowing people to languish in jails without a trial is antithetical
to the core values of the criminal justice system. Allocating
scarce resources involves tough decisions about which govern-
ment fumctions are most important.
This funding issue is relevant here because a funding defi-
ciency in the criminal justice system could easily result in an
increase in the number of wrongful convictions. Proper inves-
tigation, prosecution, and defense require adequate funding.
Investigative efforts curtailed due to lack of funds could increase
the danger that exculpatory evidence is not gathered or evalu-
ated. Prosecutors who do not have the time to review cases prop-
erly are more likely to make mistakes. Defense lawyers whose
caseloads are crushing may not be able to provide adequate de-
fense investigation and presentation. Members of the legal pro-
fession and the public as a whole need to make sure Colorado
legislators know how important it is to adequately fund all of
the players in the criminal justice system.
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Other Proposals
Other proposals may be considered that could improve accu-
racy of the criminal justice system. Some have been mentioned
briefly above, but may bear repeating.
1. New Legislation to Gain Access to DNA Evidence: In 2002,
the Colorado legislature passed legislation that improved the
access of convicted prisoners with colorable claims of innocence
to gain access to DNA evidence that might establish their in-
nocence.190 This legislation will help ensure that the most mod-
ern investigative techniques are brought to bear on cases in
which the techniques might provide definitive evidence of in-
nocence. The fact that Colorado prosecutors and defense lawyers
reached agreement on creating and passing this legislation is
evidence that all parties have a stake in the accuracy of the
criminal justice system and that there are areas of mutual in-
terest in which all can concur.
Lawyers, courts, and legislators need to keep abreast of de-
velopments in the forensic sciences. There is every reason to be-
lieve that further refinements in existing technologies and
breakthroughs in new techniques will continue to occur. While
the system cannot re-examine every case in light of each im-
provement in knowledge, the system can, and must, remain
open to re-examining the accuracy of previous procedures.
2. Record Statements of Suspects: Some commentators pro-
pose the state should require that the statements of suspects
be tape-recorded whenever feasible. Illinois has just passed a
law requiring that custodial interrogations of murder suspects
in murder cases be electronically recorded.19 ' The Alaska Su-
preme Court found a taping requirement in the Alaska due
process clause, and the Minnesota Supreme Court imposed
such a requirement as part of the Court's inherent supervisory
powers.192 This article previously pointed to reasons why taping
of statements may benefit the police, the defendant, the system,
and the truth-seeking fimction. A requirement that custodial
interrogations be electronically recorded whenever feasible
could be imposed by the court or enacted by the legislature.
3. Improve Line-up Procedures: The criminal justice system
could take advantage of social sciences research and imple-
ment procedures that improve the accuracy of identifications
through the implementation of relatively minor changes in the
procedures employed in line-ups. The DOJ guidelines 193 are a
good place to start. Such requirements could be imposed by law
enforcement agencies themselves, as in New Jersey,1 94 or by
court rule or legislation.
4. Monitor the Use of Informants: Whether they are called
"cooperating witnesses" or "snitches," it is clear that informants
raise particular and additional trustworthiness concerns. Law
enforcement should be more suspicious of informants; prosecu-
tors should demand more complete investigations of inform-
ants; defense counsel should diligently investigate informants.
The courts, through discovery, motions, expert testimony orju-
ry instructions, should make sure that all issues relating to the
trustworthiness of informants are properly presented to jurors.
5. Evaluate and Review Crime Labs: The potential problems
with crime labs and the testimony of crime lab technicians and
scientists are described above. Every governmental crime lab
needs to undergo the type of evaluation and continued review
that has been implemented by the DOJ in the case of the FBI
lab. Colorado should fund and monitor the CBI labs to make
sure that educated and trained scientists are conducting scien-
tifically valid tests under appropriate conditions and in an at-
mosphere that demands intellectual and scientific rigor.
6. Support Innocence Projects: Concerns about wrongful con-
victions have led to the creation of a number of innocence proj-
ects around the country. Some focus on capital cases; others only
on cases that involve DNA.195 The Colorado Innocence Project,
generously supported by the law firm of Arnold & Porter, ac-
cepts referrals in cases where inmates who have been convicted
and sentenced to significant prison terms in Colorado have run
out of traditional appellate options, but are still seeking to chal-
lenge their convictions on grounds that they are actually inno-
cent. All innocence projects rely significantly on the volunteer
efforts of lawyers of all types, investigators, experts, and others.
Lawyers have a special ability-and obligation-to support such
projects.
7. Continue This Discussion: Some of these proposals may be
unworkable. Other possibilities have undoubtedly been over-
looked. Everyone in the criminal justice system needs to engage
in a vigorous and honest debate about ways to reduce the inci-
dence of wrongful convictions.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers and non-lawyers alike have an important stake in
the health of the criminal justice system. In 1789, the first year
of constitutional governance of this country, George Washing-
ton wrote that he was convinced 'the due administration ofjus-
tice is the firmest pillar of good government."196 If people lose
faith in the criminal justice system, society is greatly weak-
ened. There may be no greater threat to faith in the justice sys-
tem than the threat presented by wrongful convictions.
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All reasonable steps should be taken to improve the accuracy
of the criminal justice system. A criminal justice system must
be developed in which (1) the quality ofjustice a person receives
does not depend on the size of one's wallet, (2) is color-blind, and
(3) provides a fair trial even to the most unsympathetic of de-
fendants accused of the most vicious and heinous crimes. These
fundamental and crucial goals and principles rest on the as-
sumption that the system can, in fact, determine guilt or inno-
cence with accuracy. The criminal justice system must make all
reasonable efforts to improve that accuracy.
Lawyers have special rights and powers in connection with
the justice system, and a better understanding than the gener-
al public of its needs. Therefore, lawyers have a responsibility to
that system. As individuals, as a profession, and as actors in the
justice system, lawyers can lobby the government for money
and better support, demand the highest possible level of excel-
lence from everyone involved in the system, and volunteer their
time to investigate claims ofwrongful convictions. Lawyers have
the power to improve what is arguably the most accurate justice
system on earth. They should seize every opportunity to do so.
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